Shareholding Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chains with Parallel Imports

DOI

10.2991/978-94-6239-699-9_13How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Parallel imports; Shareholding strategy; Dual-channel supply chain; Game theory; Pareto improvement

Abstract

Parallel imports, where genuine products are sold through unauthorized channels at lower prices, create significant channel conflicts in modern supply chains. This study develops a game-theoretic model to examine how equity-based coordination mechanisms—specifically forward, backward, and cross-shareholding strategies—can mitigate these conflicts between manufacturers and authorized retailers. Using a three-party Stackelberg game framework with numerical analysis, we find that: (1) cross-shareholding achieves Pareto improvements when the forward shareholding ratio k ∈ [ 0.3,0.5 ] and backward ratio j ∈ [ 0.2,0.4 ] ; (2) this bilateral equity arrangement simultaneously increases manufacturer profits by 18%, retailer profits by 21%, and quality assurance investments by 31%; (3) consumer trust levels and parallel import costs significantly influence optimal shareholding configurations. Our findings provide strategic guidance for brand manufacturers managing gray market challenges through equity-based channel coordination.

Copyright

© 2026 The Author(s)

Open Access

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Jinyu Zhang
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/06/02
TI  - Shareholding Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chains with Parallel Imports
BT  - Proceedings of the 2026 4th International Conference on Digital Economy and Management Science (CDEMS 2026)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 103
EP  - 112
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6239-699-9_13
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6239-699-9_13
ID  - Zhang2026
ER  -