Shareholder Relationship Networks and Investment Efficiency

DOI

10.2991/978-94-6239-699-9_12How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Shareholder Relationship Network; Investment Efficiency; Corporate Governance

Abstract

This paper examines how shareholder relationship networks affect corporate investment efficiency in emerging markets. Based on from 2009 to 2023, we construct shareholder networks using common ownership ties among the top ten shareholders, and employ betweenness centrality to capture firms’ network positions. Empirical results show that a firm’s network centrality significantly improves its investment efficiency. Firms with higher centrality suffer from fewer over-investment and under-investment problems. The results indicates that the coefficient of network centrality on investment inefficiency is negative. In China’s market, the governance role of shareholder networks—including better information sharing and stronger external monitoring—dominates the risk of collusive behavior.

Copyright

© 2026 The Author(s)

Open Access

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Wenhao Wang
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/06/02
TI  - Shareholder Relationship Networks and Investment Efficiency
BT  - Proceedings of the 2026 4th International Conference on Digital Economy and Management Science (CDEMS 2026)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 97
EP  - 102
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6239-699-9_12
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6239-699-9_12
ID  - Wang2026
ER  -