Excess Compensation of Independent Directors and Protection of Small and Medium sized Investors
- DOI
- 10.2991/978-94-6463-845-5_119How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- Independent director; Corporate governance; Large shareholder embezzlement
- Abstract
This article takes Chinese A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2023 as a sample to explore the impact of excessive compensation of independent directors on the protection of small and medium-sized investors. Research has found that excessive compensation for independent directors significantly promotes the embezzlement behavior of major shareholders by weakening supervisory independence and exacerbating agency costs, supporting the collusion effect hypothesis. Heterogeneity analysis shows that this effect is more prominent in companies with low information transparency and weak marketization. The study uses multidimensional robustness testing to reveal the negative governance effects of excess compensation as a medium of interest exchange, providing empirical evidence for optimizing the independent director compensation mechanism and improving the protection system for small and medium-sized investors.
- Copyright
- © 2025 The Author(s)
- Open Access
- Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Wenjie Jin PY - 2025 DA - 2025/09/16 TI - Excess Compensation of Independent Directors and Protection of Small and Medium sized Investors BT - Proceedings of the 2025 6th International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management (ICMSEM 2025) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 1214 EP - 1224 SN - 2667-1271 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-845-5_119 DO - 10.2991/978-94-6463-845-5_119 ID - Jin2025 ER -