Research on Corporate Data Sharing Policies with the Government and Incentive Mechanisms Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

DOI

10.2991/978-94-6239-758-3_6How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Enterprise-to-Government Data Sharing; Evolutionary Game; Reputation Mechanism; Fiscal Subsidy

Abstract

Enterprise-to-government data sharing is a crucial link in enhancing national governance capability, yet the incentive effects of existing policy tools often fall significantly short of expected targets. This study introduces a dual-policy framework combining reputation-based incentives and fiscal subsidies to construct an evolutionary game model of enterprise-to-government data sharing, exploring the nonlinear dynamic characteristics of corporate sharing behavior. The research finds that when data sharing leads to substantial resource and competitiveness losses for enterprises, the effectiveness of reputation mechanisms exhibits an inverted U-shaped threshold dependency, creating a “high-standard trap.” Furthermore, the “subsidy paradox” reveals the limitations of universal subsidy schemes: while low subsidies encourage “efficiency-oriented” sharing, high subsidies trigger “data hoarding” behavior due to enterprises’ concerns over competitiveness erosion. The research findings provide an important theoretical basis for the government to design an adaptive reputation mechanism for data sharing and precision-targeted fiscal incentives.

Copyright

© 2026 The Author(s)

Open Access

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Boya Shang
AU  - Feng Men
AU  - Chao Qin
AU  - Fangqi Dong
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/09/08
TI  - Research on Corporate Data Sharing Policies with the Government and Incentive Mechanisms Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
BT  - Proceedings of the 2026 7th International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management (ICMSEM 2026)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 46
EP  - 63
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6239-758-3_6
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6239-758-3_6
ID  - Shang2026
ER  -