A Three-Party Evolutionary Game Study Considering Green Travel under Government Regulation

DOI

10.2991/978-94-6463-958-2_29How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Evolutionary game; green travel modes; government regulatory policies; green transition; sustainable development

Abstract

This study constructs a three-party evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic interactions among the government, green enterprises, and non-green enterprises under the green travel mode. Based on replicator dynamics and numerical simulations, the results show that strategies converge to stable equilibria. Appropriate subsidies encourage green efforts and enhance regulatory willingness, excessive regulatory costs weaken enforcement, and higher fines curb non-green firms’ high pricing, collectively fostering green transformation and providing policy insights for sustainable development.

Copyright

© 2025 The Author(s)

Open Access

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Wenjie Zhang
AU  - Haisheng Yu
PY  - 2025
DA  - 2025/12/26
TI  - A Three-Party Evolutionary Game Study Considering Green Travel under Government Regulation
BT  - Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Management Science and Software Engineering (ICMSSE 2025)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 257
EP  - 269
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-958-2_29
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6463-958-2_29
ID  - Zhang2025
ER  -