Proceedings of the 2025 3rd International Conference on Digital Economy and Management Science (CDEMS 2025)

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Executive Compensation Incentives, Analyst Attention, and Firms’ Investment in Innovation

Authors
Jia Xu1, *, Chenying Zhao1
1Business and Tourism School, Sichuan Agricultural University, Chengdu, 611830, China
*Corresponding author. Email: 1094491518@qq.com
Corresponding Author
Jia Xu
Available Online 26 June 2025.
DOI
10.2991/978-94-6463-770-0_57How to use a DOI?
Keywords
Executive Compensation Incentives; Analyst Focus; Corporate Innovation Investment; Listed Companies
Abstract

Innovation investment is key to high-quality corporate development and should be central to business strategy. Executive compensation incentives not only shape resource allocation but also critically influence innovation efforts. Additionally, analysts, as vital sources of market intelligence, offer oversight and guidance to business decisions. This study examines A-share listed companies to assess how executive pay incentives affect innovation investments and explores the moderating role of analyst attention. The results indicate that higher executive incentives lead to increased innovation investment, an effect that is even stronger under heightened analyst scrutiny. Robustness tests confirm these findings, offering valuable insights for refining compensation policies and shaping innovation strategies.

Copyright
© 2025 The Author(s)
Open Access
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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Volume Title
Proceedings of the 2025 3rd International Conference on Digital Economy and Management Science (CDEMS 2025)
Series
Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research
Publication Date
26 June 2025
ISBN
978-94-6463-770-0
ISSN
2352-5428
DOI
10.2991/978-94-6463-770-0_57How to use a DOI?
Copyright
© 2025 The Author(s)
Open Access
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

Cite this article

risenwbib
TY  - CONF
AU  - Jia Xu
AU  - Chenying Zhao
PY  - 2025
DA  - 2025/06/26
TI  - Executive Compensation Incentives, Analyst Attention, and Firms’ Investment in Innovation
BT  - Proceedings of the 2025 3rd International Conference on Digital Economy and Management Science (CDEMS 2025)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 507
EP  - 513
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-770-0_57
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6463-770-0_57
ID  - Xu2025
ER  -