Rookie Dilemma and Seat Allocation: Applying the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm to F1 Driver Market Design

DOI

10.2991/978-94-6239-801-6_133How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Formula one; Deferred Acceptance algorithm; stable matching; Sports Economics

Abstract

The research presented in this paper assumes the Formula One (F1) driver market as the research setting and focuses on the major problems that the current junior development system faces. The career development of the drivers is heavily reliant on team-based, Junior Driver Programmes in the current institutional structure. This means that young talents in the driver field can rarely get the best matches depending on their performance which consequently influences the level of competitiveness of the game as well as its market worth. In order to overcome these issues, the paper presents the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm that was developed by Gale and Shapley, and on which the F1 driver market is based on. According to this scheme, the corresponding mechanism of the team and driver is restructured. In addition, the paper includes the problem of the economic incentive of the investment into junior development and suggests the methods of compensation, such as the transfer fee system and the revenue sharing system, to eliminate the risk of the inadequate investment towards teams. The results indicate that the suggested mechanism is capable of providing stable matching results, optimizing the efficiency of talent distribution, and increasing the competitive equilibrium. Simultaneously, it adds to the commercial value of F1 in general by raising its degree of uncertainty and creating the chances to see star drivers emerge.

Copyright

© 2026 The Author(s)

Open Access

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Yingyao Zhang
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/10/23
TI  - Rookie Dilemma and Seat Allocation: Applying the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm to F1 Driver Market Design
BT  - Proceedings of the 2026 2nd International Conference on Financial Innovation and Marketing Management (FIMM 2026)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1281
EP  - 1288
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6239-801-6_133
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6239-801-6_133
ID  - Zhang2026
ER  -