A Cooperative Game-Theoretic Framework for Multi-Objective Reservoir Operation Decision-Making

DOI

10.2991/978-94-6239-682-1_17How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Reservoir Systems; Multi-objective Decision-Making; Cooperative Game Theory; Shapley Value; The Core

Abstract

The operational scheduling of cascaded reservoirs presents a significant challenge due to the complex landscape of conflicting objectives and stakeholder interests. Existing multi-objective decision-making methods often conflate these two distinct conflicts into a single, monolithic evaluation, which can obscure whether a solution is sub-optimal due to imbalanced objectives or unstable stakeholder coalitions. To address this gap, this paper proposes a two-stage cooperative game-theoretic framework. This framework decouples the complex decision problem into two distinct, sequential games: the explicit decoupling of inter-objective conflicts (modeled as the “Target Game”) and inter-stakeholder conflicts (modeled as the “Stakeholder Game”). This decoupling enables independent assessment of two critical dimensions that were previously intertwined, overcoming the limitations of monolithic evaluation approaches. In the first stage, a “Target Game” is formulated to assess the balance of benefit distribution among operational objectives, quantified by the variance of the Shapley value. In the second stage, a “Stakeholder Game” is established to evaluate the stability of cooperation among stakeholder coalitions, measured by the degree of Core constraint violation. A final decision is then made by synthesizing these two dimensions using the weighted ideal point method. The framework’s effectiveness is demonstrated through a case study on a representative two-reservoir system. The results indicate that the proposed approach can identify a solution that, while involving a calculated trade-off in power generation, yields substantial improvements in both ecological conditions and flood safety. This study contributes a structured and analytically robust methodology for selecting holistically superior strategies in complex reservoir systems.

Copyright

© 2026 The Author(s)

Open Access

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Junbo Liu
AU  - Changwen Li
AU  - Han Zhang
AU  - Liangzhe He
AU  - Chenggang Li
AU  - Changlong Gao
AU  - Guanghui Wu
AU  - Chenxi Du
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/06/30
TI  - A Cooperative Game-Theoretic Framework for Multi-Objective Reservoir Operation Decision-Making
BT  - Proceedings of the 2025 7th International Conference on Civil Architecture and Urban Engineering (ICCAUE 2025)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 165
EP  - 174
SN  - 2589-4943
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6239-682-1_17
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6239-682-1_17
ID  - Liu2026
ER  -