Government Subsidies and Manufacturer Investment Decisions in the Electric Vehicle Industry: An Evolutionary Game Analysis
- DOI
- 10.2991/978-94-6463-724-3_9How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- Electric vehicles; government subsidies; investment decisions; evolutionary game theory
- Abstract
This study analyzes the interaction between government subsidy policies and electric vehicle (EV) manufacturers’ investment decisions using an evolutionary game theory model. The government can choose to provide subsidies or not, while EV manufacturers decide whether to invest in production based on the subsidies offered. The model shows that government subsidies can encourage investment by manufacturers, but the optimal subsidy level depends on the strategic behaviors of both parties. Numerical simulations reveal that balanced subsidy policies, considering both production costs and social benefits, lead to a stable equilibrium. This research provides insights into the design of effective subsidy policies to promote the growth of the EV industry.
- Copyright
- © 2025 The Author(s)
- Open Access
- Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Liu Cao AU - Qingmei Tan PY - 2025 DA - 2025/05/26 TI - Government Subsidies and Manufacturer Investment Decisions in the Electric Vehicle Industry: An Evolutionary Game Analysis BT - Proceedings of the 2025 5th International Conference on Informatization Economic Development and Management (IEDM 2025) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 88 EP - 94 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-724-3_9 DO - 10.2991/978-94-6463-724-3_9 ID - Cao2025 ER -