The Evolutionary Game of Corporate Disclosure Choice under Government Regulation

DOI

10.2991/978-2-38476-462-4_71How to use a DOI?

Keywords

The Tripartite Evolutionary Game; Environmental Information Disclosure; Government Regulation

Abstract

Environmental information disclosure is an effective means to strengthen the main responsibility of enterprises to implement the ecological environment, an important way to promote public participation in supervising the environmental behavior of enterprises, and an important initiative to promote the modernization of the ecological and environmental governance system and governance capacity. Based on finite rationality, this paper constructs a three-party game model, establishes the benefit matrix and the replication dynamic equation, analyzes the government, enterprises, and environmental protection review agencies, and simulates the system evolution process using Matlab. The study shows that the relationship between benefits and costs is the main factor affecting whether enterprises, government, environmental protection review agencies actively disclose environmental information, the larger the difference between the two, the stronger the initial willingness to cooperate, the faster the evolution of the game system toward the ideal stable point, reasonable rewards and punishments can create a good initial environment, improve the initial willingness of each subject to cooperate, and promote the stable evolution of the system. It brings useful reference for the sound legislative standard system, perfect disclosure mechanism, and perfect reward and punishment mechanism.

Copyright

© 2025 The Author(s)

Open Access

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Jingwen Zhang
PY  - 2025
DA  - 2025/09/12
TI  - The Evolutionary Game of Corporate Disclosure Choice under Government Regulation
BT  - Proceedings of the 2025 9th International Seminar on Education, Management and Social Sciences (ISEMSS 2025)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 643
EP  - 649
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-2-38476-462-4_71
DO  - 10.2991/978-2-38476-462-4_71
ID  - Zhang2025
ER  -