Proceedings of the 2025 3rd International Academic Conference on Management Innovation and Economic Development (MIED 2025)

<Previous Article In Volume
Next Article In Volume>

Research on the Evolutionary Game Mechanism of Carbon Emission Data Supervisory from the Perspective of Law-Economy Synergy

Authors
Yinghui Chi1, *, Fuyuan Yang1, Xiaomin Yang1, Yangguo Hu1
1China University of Petroleum (East China), Qingdao, 266000, China
*Corresponding author. Email: chiyinghui2022@163.com
Corresponding Author
Yinghui Chi
Available Online 17 September 2025.
DOI
10.2991/978-94-6463-835-6_121How to use a DOI?
Keywords
Energy Enterprises; Carbon Emission Data Supervision; Evolutionary Game; Legal-economic Synergy; Policy Design
Abstract

Under China's “dual carbon” goals, carbon emission data supervision faces coordination dilemmas between legal constraints and economic incentives. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, energy enterprises, and Third-party Verification Institutions. Using numerical simulation, it reveals the dynamic evolution path and equilibrium conditions. Key findings include: 1) A significant synergistic effect exists between legal constraints and economic incentives; 2) The government’s minimum penalty intensity for data falsification must exceed enterprises’ carbon data management costs; 3) Enterprises’ internal management costs must achieve systematic risk control within acceptable ranges; 4) TPVIs’ verification standards must balance accuracy with stakeholder acceptability to reach high-efficiency equilibrium. A law-economy synergistic policy framework is proposed, utilizing legal “hard constraints” and economic “soft constraints” to resolve “high-cost Strong Supervision” and “low-efficiency Weak Supervision” dilemmas, promoting “Active Emission Reduction” and ensuring carbon market fairness.

Copyright
© 2025 The Author(s)
Open Access
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

Download article (PDF)

<Previous Article In Volume
Next Article In Volume>
Volume Title
Proceedings of the 2025 3rd International Academic Conference on Management Innovation and Economic Development (MIED 2025)
Series
Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research
Publication Date
17 September 2025
ISBN
978-94-6463-835-6
ISSN
2352-5428
DOI
10.2991/978-94-6463-835-6_121How to use a DOI?
Copyright
© 2025 The Author(s)
Open Access
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

Cite this article

risenwbib
TY  - CONF
AU  - Yinghui Chi
AU  - Fuyuan Yang
AU  - Xiaomin Yang
AU  - Yangguo Hu
PY  - 2025
DA  - 2025/09/17
TI  - Research on the Evolutionary Game Mechanism of Carbon Emission Data Supervisory from the Perspective of Law-Economy Synergy
BT  - Proceedings of the 2025 3rd International Academic Conference on Management Innovation and Economic Development (MIED 2025)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1127
EP  - 1143
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-835-6_121
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6463-835-6_121
ID  - Chi2025
ER  -